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> Upshot • Palacios, Escobar and Cés-
pedes consider misrepresentation and 
comparability in the context of the en-
activist approach of colour perception. 
This consideration leads them to pro-
pose the introduction of a weak form 
of representationalism to account for 
internal representation of “reality” and 
“shared experience” and to accommo-
date the Bayesian principle of prior in-
formation used in machine vision. The 
weak representationalism is not limited 
to brain states but may include embod-
ied factors to be compatible with the 
enactivist framework. My commentary 
will essentially consider the misrepre-
sentation and comparability arguments 
used by the authors to introduce the no-
tion of representation.
« 1 » In their target article, Adrián 
Palacios, María-José Escobar and Esteban 
Céspedes define misrepresentation or il-
lusion as follows: an object o has some 
properties F, according to some percep-
tual experience, but in “reality,” o does not 
have F (§7). To illustrate misrepresentation 
they present a picture of a coloured Rubik’s 
cube. It should be noted that the observer 
is viewing an object’s image, not an ob-
ject in its lived environment. This point is 
important if we are to consider misrepre-
sentations in an ecologically valid context 
taken as the relevant domain of observa-
tion for an enactive account of perception. 
From this image, the misrepresentation 
concerns the colour mismatch between the 
central square patches of the frontal and 
the top sides of the cube despite having 
the same chromaticities or colour (as can 
be seen when patches are surrounded and 
somehow isolated by black circles, Figure 3 
right). The misrepresentation consists in 
claiming that we attribute the property of 
colour mismatch F to the image of the ob-
ject o while in “reality” there is none. The 
Rubik’s cube illusion is further explained 
by the authors:
“ A subject finds itself in a perceptual experi-
ence e of illusion just in case e occurs in some 
anomalous perceptual context (which contains 
some relevant set of physical states p) and e 
would differ considerably if it occurred in a 
normalized perceptual context (which also con-
tained p).” (§40)
« 2 » Contrarily to the authors, I would 
like to argue that the image of the Rubik’s 
cube elicits a misrepresentation-revealing 
mechanism that is normally at work to en-
sure a veridical representation of the state 
of affairs in the lived world. When looking 
at the image of an object, as opposed to 
the 3d object that is comprehended within 
the lived experience’s complexity, we must 
make an interpretation to ascribe meaning 
to an otherwise impoverished visual stimu-
lus (i.e., 2d instead of 3d and absence of 
proper sensorimotor activities), that is, 
there are not many relevant sets of physical 
states p attached to the perceptual experi-
ence e. Looking at Figure  3, one does not 
see a bi-dimensional array of black-and-
white or coloured patches but a Rubik’s 
cube lit by an upper-right illuminant cast-
ing its shadow on a checked-pattern sur-
face. The 3d cube percept is induced by lin-
ear perspective indicators and, for instance, 
the smaller size of the back-left corner 
white patch as compared to the front-right 
corner green, does not strike the observer 
as being different in size, rather it is con-
sistent with what would be the size pro-
portion of a 3d cube image projected on 
the retina and thus provides a coherent 3d 
representation of the cube. Likewise, in the 
lived environment, the colour signal that 
reaches the retina C(l) is the product of the 
illuminant E(l) by the surface reflectance 
S(l). If the central patches from the two 
sides of the cube share the same reflect-
ance, and the light intensity is reduced on 
the frontal side, as we are led to believe, be-
cause of the shadow [E´(l)], then the col-
our signal will change accordingly [C´(l)]. 
Yet, despite the change of illuminant, the 
colour signal from the two patches is the 
same, in this condition, our perception is 
forced to conclude that two patches do not 
share the same reflectance; their colour is 
different. The illusion arises as the change 
of illuminant is not taken into account in 
the representation of the patch’s colour 
and the misperception is coherent with 
the shadow assumption; the same coloured 
patch appears brown on the illuminated 
side and orange on the shadowed side. In 
the lived environment, accounting for the 
illuminant to ascribe colour to surfaces is 
of course more “veridical” than relying on 
the colour signal. The Rubik’s cube trick 
thus reveals aspects of the colour constancy 
mechanism that allows us to keep a rela-
tively stable colour appearance of surfaces 
in a light-changing environment, which is 
more veridical than relying on the colour 
signal that reaches the eye.
« 3 » If the images may have a limited 
ecological value in evidencing genuine 
misrepresentations, there are some good 
examples occurring in the natural environ-
ment. For instance, coloured shadows can 
be observed at sunset, when sunlight is get-
ting dimmer and light from the sky is still 
bright. Coloured shadows, first reported by 
Leonardo da Vinci, can be described as fol-
lows: when an opaque object is lit by two 
light sources of different colour (say white 
W and yellow Y), the illuminated object 
casts two shadows (W´ and Y´) intercept-
ing the light from each source (W and Y). 
Consequently, each light source illuminates 
the shadow produced by the other source 
(W´Y and Y´W). In these conditions, the 
shadow (W´) illuminated by the yellow 
source (Y) appears dark yellow and the 
shadow (Y´) lit by the white light (W) ap-
pears bright blue, in other words, a colour 
that does not exist in any of the light sourc-
es (Lanthony 2006). Initially, coloured 
shadows were believed to result from light 
reflection, that is, from a physical attribute, 
but today they are understood as an exam-
ple of misinterpretation attributable to col-
our-constancy mechanisms (Mollon 1995). 
Simultaneous colour contrast offers anoth-
er example of misrepresentation. Colour 
contrast is observed when two contigu-
ous coloured surfaces mutually influence 
each other’s appearance in the direction of 
their respective complementary colour; an 
orange next to a red will appear yellower 
while the red will appear more violet.
« 4 » These phenomena could be re-
ferred to as misrepresentations, but to para-
phrase Francisco Varela, who, after stating 
that there is no relationship between light 
and colour, insisted that it was not a para-
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dox but rather an observation that should be 
taken to be at the heart of knowledge of co-
lour perception,1 coloured shadow and co-
lour contrast are revealing something about 
the nature of our colour vision. Coloured 
shadow or colour contrast would appear as 
“correct” perceptual experience if, according 
to and in agreement with the author’s defi-
nition, these phenomena are “in correspon-
dence with the relevant enactive condition 
of the perceiver and its environment” (§41). 
Likewise, the search for properties in an in-
dependent pre-given world that would reg-
ister with the uniqueness of the unique hues 
or the boundary of our colour categories 
is vain and their neurophysiological bases 
are still elusive (see Wuerger, Atkinson & 
Cropper 2005 for the former and Bachy et 
al. 2012 for the latter). These observations 
taken together are one of the very argu-
ments (comparative argument excepted as 
not developed here) that called for an en-
active approach, between objectivism and 
subjectivism views, where “colours are prop-
erties of the world that result from animal-
environment codetermination” (Thompson, 
Palacios & Varela 1992: 21).
« 5 » The second argument concerns the 
question of the comparability of perceptual 
experience between individuals. Because of 
the idiosyncratic nature of enaction, where 
a living and autonomous organism dynami-
cally enacts its lived environment, percep-
tual experience is conceivably bound to be 
itself idiosyncratic. Palacios, Escobar and 
Céspedes judge this thesis counter-intuitive 
and appeal to the language communality on 
which their intuition relies. I would argue 
that the idiosyncrasy of our phenomenolog-
ical experience is not counter-intuitive, and 
evidence of shared experience, if it exists, is 
probably not to be found in language.
« 6 » Take the following example: in-
stead of Susan, who is perceiving red, let us 
ask John, who is daltonian.2 Pointing out a 
1 | In the dVd “Monte Grande” by Franz 
Reichle.
2 | “daltonian” refers to the X-chromosome 
linked condition involving either the loss or the 
alteration of the gene encoding for medium or 
long wavelength cone pigments. Phenotypically, 
the hereditary condition is known as dichroma-
cy (loss of one class of cones) or anomalous tri-
chromacy (when one class of cone is altered in its 
red object, John might quite rightly name 
its colour despite the fact that his colour vi-
sion is limited to a gamut of yellow to blue 
tones as judged by normal trichromats. It 
has been known by ophthalmologists that 
colour naming was of little help in colour 
vision assessment; daltonians are far bet-
ter at naming than ordering colours. The 
paradox is that unless the task explicitly re-
quests it, daltonians will not use their better 
naming abilities to optimise their perform-
ance in colour ordering tasks (Jameson & 
Hurvich 1978). Experiments have further 
revealed that daltonians’ colour catego-
risation by naming is very similar to that 
of normal trichromats, while their percep-
tual colour categorisation is impaired and 
contains mismatches typical of their deficit 
(Bonnardel 2006). daltonians’ colour per-
ception is qualitatively and radically differ-
ent from that of normal trichromats, and 
these differences are not limited to colour 
appearance but also impact multimodal 
sensory integration, aesthetic judgments, 
communication, etc. In other words, dalto-
nians enact a world from their dichromatic 
embodied cognition that shares little with 
that of normal trichromats. despite this 
world of difference, it is exceptional for 
daltonians to make themselves identifiable 
through their behaviour or their language. 
The assumption of comparable perceptual 
experience between individuals put for-
ward by the authors to account for the ob-
served coherence in behaviours in a given 
context does not appear correct nor is it 
necessary for a theory of perception.
« 7 » It is understandable that the no-
tion of representations at the heart of early 
computer vision is still important in the de-
velopment of contemporary artificial sys-
tems, but its value, even in its weak form, 
for an enactive approach of perception is 
questionable, as
“ […] cognition is no longer seen as problem 
solving on the basis of representations; instead, 
cognition in its most encompassing sense con-
sists in the enactment or bringing forth of a 
world by a viable history of structural cou-
pling.” (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 2016: 205)
spectral sensitivity). Incidence varies with race, its 
being most common among Europeans, and with 
gender (7.4% in males vs. 0.5% in females).
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> Upshot • While the objectivist view of 
perception provides us with a common-
sensical starting point, it quickly gives 
rise to unsolvable puzzles. The enactivist 
view, on the other hand, starts by chal-
lenging common sense, but it does not 
lead to the same unsolvable puzzles of 
the objectivist line of thought. Enactiv-
ism does not deny perceptual illusions 
or individual differences; it simply strips 
them of the status of perennial philo-
sophical puzzles.
« 1 » From a naïve perspective, colors 
do not immediately pose philosophical 
problems. The colors of objects, just like 
their shapes or edges, appear to be percep-
tible attributes. They can be experienced by 
us, but they do not depend on us. The naïve 
perspective also gives us a criterion for de-
ciding whether a color perception is illusory 
or veridical. namely, an instance of (subjec-
tive) color perception is veridical only if the 
perceived color exists out there, so to speak, 
objectively.
« 2 » Although the naïve perspective 
does not immediately appear to be problem-
